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Abstract
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incen-
tives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal protection affects the expropriation of
shareholders and the blockholder’s incentives to monitor. Because monitoring weakens man-
agerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship between legal protection and
ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates monitoring better laws strengthen
the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration and legal protection are inversely re-
lated. By contrast, when legal protection and monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken
the monitoring incentives, and the relationship between legal protection and ownership concen-
tration is non monotonic. This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can
reap private benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate
the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders.
JEL Classification: G 34
Keywords: Monitoring; Ownership structure; Corporate governance; Law and finance
1 Introduction
Following the pioneering work by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), a growing literature argues
that cross-country differences in corporate governance, and more broadly in financial systems,
are shaped by the quality of legal rules protecting outside investors. Examples of documented
regularities are that better legal investor protection is associated with increased breadth and
depth of capital markets, a faster pace of new security issues, and a greater reliance on external
financing to fund firm growth (for surveys see La Porta et al. 2000b; Denis and McConnell
2003). One prominent issue in this recent literature is the relation between cross-country
ownership patterns and legal rules. Empirical studies indicate that ownership is on average
more concentrated in countries with poor legal shareholder protection. This finding leads La
Porta et al. (1998) to argue that “with poor investor protection, ownership concentration
becomes a substitute for legal protection, because only large shareholders can hope to receive
a return on their investment.” By contrast, investors are willing to take minority positions and
finance companies in countries where legal rules are extensive and well enforced.
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This paper scrutinizes the commonly accepted argument that legal shareholder protection
and outside ownership concentration are substitutes (see e.g., Denis and McConnell, 2003, p.
21). To this end we analyze the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial
incentives, monitoring, and ownership in a model where shareholder control comes with costs
and benefits. As emphasized in the law and finance literature, legal protection has an impact
on the ease with which the manager, possibly in collusion with the blockholder, can divert cor-
porate resources. There is, however, another channel which this literature has overlooked: the
quality of legal rules also shapes the large shareholder’s incentives to monitor. This effect mat-
ters for the relationship between the law and the ownership concentration because monitoring,
like legal protection, weakens managerial incentives. Moreover, the impact of legal rules on the
relation between ownership concentration and monitoring intensity is not uniform but depends
on how legal rules interact with monitoring. While some rules tend to complement monitoring,
others are more likely to be substitutes. Overall, we find that outside ownership concentration
and legal shareholder protection are not necessarily substitutes. In particular, when the law
is a substitute for monitoring, legal protection and ownership concentration can be comple-
ments. Thus, our model can also account for a non monotone relationship between ownership
concentration and legal protection as for instance Aganin and Volpin (2003) document for Italy.
We consider a firm with a large shareholder and otherwise dispersed ownership. The firm
has the prospect of a valuable project which realizes with some probability only if the manager
1
As regards inside or managerial block ownership, an argument based on Jensen and Meckling (1976) comes
to the same conclusion. When legal investor protection is insufficient, entrepreneurs are forced to maintain large
positions themselves to align their incentives with other shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
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exerts effort. Given that the project is undertaken, the manager decides how much of the pro-
ceeds to pay out as dividends to the shareholders and how much to extract as private benefits.
Managerial private benefit extraction involves no deadweight loss, but is subject to monitoring
and legal constraints. More precisely, we assume that the law puts an upper bound on private
benefit extraction and that monitoring lowers this bound further. By limiting private bene-
fit extraction monitoring and legal protection increase shareholder control but also discourage
managerial initiative. Depending on the quality of legal protection, maximizing net shareholder
return may thus require to constrain monitoring by limiting ownership concentration or to offer
the manager a higher wage.
Our model obviously assumes that the large shareholder and the manager are distinct par-
ties, irrespective of the block size. In our view, this definition of insider and outsider is not
refuted by the observation that many controlling owners are Board Members and participate
in management. Being a Board Member or even its Chairman is quite different from being
the CEO of the firm, and their interests are likely to differ.
2
This does, however, not preclude
that they may on occasions collude at the expense of the small shareholders. Initially we ab-
stract from such collusion and assume that private benefits are not transferable, or equivalently
that the interests of the large and the small shareholders are perfectly congruent. We relax
this assumption later (Section 5) and allow for collusion between the manager and the large
shareholder.
When private benefits are not transferable, the governance problem is reduced to the tra-
ditional conflict of interest between manager and (all) shareholders. In accordance with the
widely-held view that legal shareholder protection and ownership concentration are substitutes,
we find that legal rules and the optimal amount of monitoring are inversely related. Weaker
rules enable the manager to extract more private benefits. Therefore, the manager’s incentive
to exert effort can be preserved even if he is monitored more closely. This effect, henceforth
the extraction effect, does, however, not imply that the optimal ownership concentration must
also increase. The reason is that weaker legal protection also affects the large shareholder’s
incentives to monitor, henceforth the monitoring effect. The monitoring effect may reinforce or
counteract the extraction effect depending on how legal shareholder protection interacts with
monitoring.
Legal protection can be thought of as directly limiting the scope for managerial extraction
and hence making monitoring less needed. Alternatively, one may argue that legal protection
2
The Agnelli family is generally considered to firmly control Fiat, the Italian car manufacturer. In 1976,
when Giovanni Agnelli was the Chairman of the Board, the CEO of Fiat, De Benedetti, tried to gain control
of Fiat at the expense of the Agnellis. Although this attempt was successfully stopped by Giovanni Agnelli,
it illustrates that controlling shareholder and manager are not a team but distinct parties, each with its own
interests.
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facilitates or complements monitoring. We do not subscribe to one or the other interpretation
but believe that some legal provisions are more suitably thought of as a substitute to monitoring
and others as a complement. (We provide examples of both types of rules at the end of
Section 2.) Our purpose is to show that the assumed relation between monitoring and the
law determines the shape of the relationship between legal protection and outside ownership
concentration.
In the case where monitoring and the law are (assumed to be) complements, legal share-
holder protection and ownership concentration are inversely related. As legal protection be-
comes weaker, more monitoring is required and monitoring becomes less effective. Hence, a
more concentrated ownership concentration is needed to implement the desired higher level of
monitoring. In the case where monitoring and the law are substitutes, the monitoring effect
runs counter to the extraction effect. Weaker legal protection allows the manager to extract
more private benefits but also increases the large shareholder’s monitoring incentives for a
given equity stake. If the effect on the manager’s incentives dominates the effect on the large
shareholder’s incentives, the optimal outside ownership concentration increases. Conversely,
when the monitoring effect dominates the extraction effect, the large shareholder’s stake needs
to be reduced to restore the manager’s incentives. It is, however, not possible to determine
for which levels of legal protection the monitoring or the extraction effect prevails unless one
resorts to specific functional forms. After solving the “general” model without such restrictions,
we provide some examples to further illustrate our results.
Our central proposition that better legal shareholder protection can go together with more
or less concentrated ownership proves robust to collusion between the manager and the large
shareholder. We further propose that better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alle-
viate the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders. When legal protection and
outside ownership concentration are substitutes, better legal protection entails a lower owner-
ship concentration. Owning a smaller stake, the large shareholder may choose to divert more
corporate resources.
Our paper builds on Burkart et al. (1997) who show that ownership dispersion is a commit-
ment device to delegate effective control to the manager. In their model, the optimal ownership
concentration solves a trade-off between initiative and control. The present paper applies this
basic trade-off to examine the relationship between legal shareholder protection and optimal
outside ownership concentration, allowing for both congruent and conflicting shareholder in-
terests. Our paper thus relates to the large literature on ownership structure as a governance
mechanism. Some of the theoretical literature explicitly examines the link between owner-
ship structure and legal protection. Himmelberg et al. (2001) derive an inverse relationship
between ownership concentration and quality of the law based on the classical trade-off be-
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tween incentives and risk. La Porta et al. (2002) show how better legal protection enables
a wealth-constrained entrepreneur to raise more outside finance, and Shleifer and Wolfenzon
(2002) examine the impact of legal shareholder protection in a market equilibrium model. In
these papers, ownership concentration is typically beneficial irrespective of the quality of the
law because it aligns the insiders’ interests with those of the investors. The inverse relation-
ship between inside ownership concentration and legal shareholder protection follows from a
multiplier effect. Better legal protection increases the amount of pledgeable funds. This en-
ables an entrepreneur with some given wealth to raise more outside funds, thereby lowering the
fraction that his wealth contributes to the overall funding, i.e., his equity stake. Castillo and
Skaperdas (2003) model the conflict between the owner-manager and the outside shareholders
as an (wasteful) appropriation contest to secure a share of the firm’s value. Since better legal
protection strengthens the outsiders’ relative power in this contest, it facilitates raising funds
but induces the outsiders to engage in more appropriative activities. To counteract this adverse
effect, the manager-owner has to commit to less appropriative activities by retaining a larger
stake of the firm. Overall, Castillo and Skaperdas obtain a non-monotone relationship between
the quality of the law and the size of the stake retained by the manager-owner.
Like the present paper, Stepanov (2003) examines the relationship between legal protection
and outside ownership concentration. In his model, the alignment of shareholders’ interests is
the binding constraint in regimes with weak legal protection and implies an inverse relationship
between the law and the outside blockholder’s stake. In regimes with strong legal protection, the
optimal monitoring intensity balances on the margin the monitoring cost and the deadweight
loss associated with private benefit extraction, as in Pagano and Röell (1998). Since better
legal protection increases the deadweight loss of private benefits extraction, monitoring and thus
outside ownership concentration increase with the quality of the law. Thus, the model implies
a “U-shaped” relationship between the quality of the law and outside ownership concentration.
In our model, outside ownership concentration is determined by the trade-off between initiative
and control, and ownership is fully dispersed in regimes with strong legal protection.
Finally, Burkart et al. (2003) endogenize in a model of managerial succession the choice
between inside and outside block ownership and show how inside ownership concentration
emerges in regimes with poor legal protection and separation of ownership and management
in regimes with good legal protection. As regards the monitoring technology, they assume
that legal protection does not affect the (marginal) effectiveness of monitoring. In contrast,
the present paper argues that the law has a direct impact on the monitoring incentives and
therefore affects the mapping from ownership concentration to monitoring.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 examines the
relationship between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, monitoring, and own-
4
ership concentration when shareholders have congruent interests. Section 4 relates our main
results to the empirical findings in the literature. Section 5 considers two extensions; collu-
sion between the large shareholder and the manager and inefficient private benefit extraction.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a firm run by a risk neutral manager (M). A fraction α of shares is held by a single
investor, the large shareholder (L), while the remaining fraction 1−α is dispersed among small
shareholders. All shareholders are risk-neutral.
At date 1, the manager chooses to exert a non-verifiable effort e ∈ {0, 1} at a cost ce.
3
If the manager does not exert effort, the date 3 value of the firm remains unchanged and is
normalized to zero. If e = 1, the manager finds with probability p a project that generates with
certainty proceeds Π at date 3. Although a project may not be undertaken (with probability
1 − p) leaving firm value unchanged, exerting effort is efficient, i.e., pΠ − c > 0. At date 2,
shareholders can monitor the manager. The monitoring technology and the interaction between
monitoring and legal shareholder protection are described below.
At date 3, the proceeds from the project are used to remunerate the manager and to
pay dividends to all shareholders or to generate private benefits. Private benefits should be
interpreted broadly to include theft or self-serving transactions with related parties as well as
any use of corporate resources that is not in the (dispersed) shareholders’ best interest such
as e.g., empire building. The non-contractible resource allocation decision is modelled as the
choice of φ ∈ [0, 1] such that dividends and managerial remuneration are (1−φ)Π and the non-
verifiable private benefits are φΠ. While the extraction of private benefit does not involve any
deadweight loss (inefficient extraction would not alter our results), both the law and monitoring
limit the expropriation of shareholders.
Legal shareholder protection is modelled as putting an upper limit φ on the extraction of
private benefits. That is, the law effectively prescribes that at least (1 −
¯
φ)Π of the project
proceeds are paid out to shareholders and manager. The upper limit φ decreases with the
quality of the law which we denote by γ ∈ [γ, γ¯], with γ¯ corresponding to the highest level
of legal protection. Weak legal protection can be due either to poor quality of the law or to
ineffective enforcement (Pistor et al. 2000). We abstract from such differences and focus on
the ultimate impact of the law.
The law and finance literature documents that differences in legal protection are associated
with differences in financial development. This suggests that contractual solutions cannot
3
Our results also obtain in a continuous effort choice model, provided that the response of managerial effort
to monitoring is on the margin sufficiently large.
5
(fully) compensate for weak legal investor protection. Indeed, Nenova (2003) documents the
limited usefulness of contractual solutions in poor legal environments. We capture this notion
by assuming that firms cannot opt out of the legal environment via contracts, say through a
better corporate charter. Thus, the parameter γ is appropriately interpreted as the quality of
investor protection, including the contractual options available in the legal system.
While shareholders cannot choose the quality of law, they can monitor to further limit
managerial expropriation. After having observed the manager’s effort choice, shareholders can
at date 2 exert a non-verifiable monitoring effort m ≥ 0 at a cost C(m). The cost C(m) is an
increasing and convex function of the monitoring intensity m with dC(0)/dm = 0. Because
of the free-riding by small shareholders (say due to a small opportunity cost), only the large
shareholder has an incentive to monitor. The quality of legal protection could in principal
also be an argument of the monitoring cost. We do not explicitly account for this possibility
because it is encompassed within our framework as we will show later.
Thus, monitoring and the law jointly determine the residual (fraction of) proceeds over
which the manager has full discretion. Let
¯
φ(m,γ)Π denote this maximum amount of proceeds
that the manager can freely allocate.
Assumption 1 The function
¯
φ(m,γ) is decreasing in γ, decreasing and convex in m, and
satisfies ∂φ(0, γ)/∂m < 0 for all γ ∈ [γ, γ¯].
Better legal protection and more monitoring both reduce the scope for managerial expro-






Thus, the present model assumes that managerial effort, monitoring, and project proceeds
are observable but not verifiable. Legal shareholder protection limits the possibility to extract
private benefits which is tantamount to making part of the project proceeds verifiable. Moni-
toring plays a similar role. It gives the large shareholder the discretion to make an additional
fraction of the project proceeds verifiable. Monitoring is, however, costly to the large share-
holder whereas reliance on legal protection is free to the shareholders. Clearly, this does not
apply to all forms of legal protection, such as e.g., litigation. Our analysis does not require
that legal protection is literally free, but that restricting managerial discretion to a given level
through better laws and less monitoring is cheaper for the large shareholder than achieving the
same through more monitoring and weaker laws.
Having described the constraints that monitoring and the law put on the manager’s dis-
cretion, we can now fully specify how the proceeds are allocated (given that the project is
undertaken): Legal shareholder protection demands that [1−
¯
φ(0, γ)]Π are paid out either as
dividends to all shareholders or as remuneration to the manager. It proves convenient to express
6
the manager’s remuneration as a fraction w of the expected project proceeds pΠ. The allocation
of the remaining
¯
φ(0, γ)Π depends on monitoring. When monitoring with intensity m the large
shareholder gains control over [φ(0, γ)− φ(m,γ)]Π and decides jointly with the manager how
to use these proceeds. The manager retains full discretion over the residual proceeds φ(m,γ)Π.
We model the joint decision of the manager and large shareholder over the use of the proceeds
[φ(0, γ) − φ(m,γ)]Π as a simple Nash bargaining game: With probability 1 − ψ, the large
shareholder chooses φ ∈ [φ(m,γ), φ(0, γ)] and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer how to share the
resulting private benefits with the manager. The manager either accepts the offer or rejects
it in which case φ is equal to φ(m,γ) and the entire amount [φ(0, γ) − φ(m,γ)]Π is paid out
as dividends. With the complementary probability ψ, the manager sets φ ∈ [φ(m,γ), φ(0, γ)]
and offers part of the resulting private benefits to the large shareholder who either accepts it
or rejects it in which case φ is again equal to φ(m,γ).
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The outcome of the bargaining game depends on whether or not the large shareholder can
enjoy part of the private benefits. Legal rules such as fiduciary duties or equal treatment
provisions affect the transferability of private benefits and thereby the extent to which the
large shareholder’s interests conflict (coincide) with those of the manager and with those of the
small shareholders. Besides legal constraints, there are other reasons which may prevent the
manager and the large shareholder from sharing private benefits. For instance, private benefits
may require consumption on the job, such as perks or labor hoarding, or may be indivisible, and
the manager has insufficient wealth to compensate the large shareholder. The transferability of
private benefits may also depend on the identity of a large shareholders. Typically, institutional
investors (or their representatives) are viewed as being interested in security benefits, while a
supplier or customer of the firm can benefit from preferential transaction terms. We assume
that private benefits are either transferable and non-transferable for non-regulatory reasons
and consider both cases.
A final important aspect of the model concerns the relation between legal shareholder pro-
tection and monitoring. As emphasized in the introduction, there are two interpretations for
why better legal protection saves monitoring costs, each reflecting a different understanding of
how legal shareholder protection and monitoring interact. One way to think about the interac-
tion is that the law directly reduces the scope for expropriation and thereby reduces the need
for monitoring. Alternatively, one may argue that legal protection facilitates monitoring. In
our opinion, neither one nor the other view is universally valid. Instead, the appropriate inter-
pretation differs across legal rules. Before providing examples, we make the two interpretations
4
Our bargaining game implies that the manager receives additional private benefits if the large shareholder
consents to divert (part of) [φ(0, γ)−φ(m, γ)]Π. This is tantamount to assuming that the manager is indispens-
able for the extraction of these private benefits, say due to his knowledge and expertise. Otherwise, the large
shareholder would have no reason to share the diverted [
¯
φ(0, γ)− φ(m, γ)]Π with the manager.
7





































Monitoring and the law are substitutes when the marginal impact of monitoring on private
benefits extraction decreases with the quality of the law, i.e., ∂
2
φ/∂m∂γ > 0. By contrast,
when the law increases the marginal effectiveness of monitoring, i.e. ∂
2
φ/∂m∂γ < 0, we refer to
monitoring and the law as complements. The third possibility is that the marginal effectiveness
of monitoring is independent of the law, i.e., ∂
2
φ/∂m∂γ = 0. As we will show, this is merely a
special version of the case where legal protection and monitoring are complements.
Rules pertaining to shareholder protection come from various sources such as e.g., company
and security laws, stock exchange regulations, and accounting standards. Following Definition
1, we classify legal rules as complements if they reduce the (marginal) cost of monitoring and
as substitutes if they reduce the (marginal) return from monitoring.
Straightforward examples of complements are disclosure requirements and accounting stan-
dards. Active shareholders’ marginal monitoring costs are lower when firms are legally required
to disclose more (accurate) information about their performance and financial condition.
5
Also
complements to monitoring are the legal standards applied by courts in lawsuits against insiders
in cases of asset diversion. A (large) shareholder’s cost of challenging a self-dealing transac-
tion increases with the specificity that his allegations have to meet for a judicial inquiry
6
and
with the extent to which liability standards protect insiders from litigation.
7
Initiation and
ratification rights are another example of complements. Monitoring is more effective when the
law grants shareholders the power to ratify or initiate important (recurrent) decisions, such as




The U.S. has the most stringent accounting standards and disclosure requirements. Listed U.S. firms do not
only have to report their current financial position and past performance, but also disclose detailed information
about managerial salaries and the background of their directors. In addition, firms must provide some forward-
looking information, notably an assessment by management about likely future developments (Kraakman et al.
2003). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (§ 401) further raises these requirements by mandating the disclosure of all
off-balance sheet transactions, obligations, and other relationships with unconsolidated entities that may have a
material effect on the firm’s financial conditions.
6
For instance, the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995 raised the pleading stan-
dard. Under the PSLRA plaintiffs have to substantiate their allegations and identify specific events or actions
which if proved in court would constitute fraud. Otherwise, the judge dismisses the case (Siegel 2003).
7
For instance, most European and U.S. state courts refuse to review self-dealing transactions that have been
ratified by disinterested board members, unless there is proof of gross negligence (Enriques 2000). Testing
the effectiveness of cross-listing as a bonding device, Siegel (2003) documents how costly and difficult it is for
(minority) shareholders of Mexican firms with ADRs (American Depositary Receipt) to prosecute under the
U.S. regulatory regime insiders for blatant and large-scale asset diversion.
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In the U.S., initiation and ratification rights are rather limited. For instance, the shareholder proposal
8
Turning to rules that are a substitute to monitoring, one example is the mandatory dividend
rules, common in French-civil law countries (La Porta et al. 1998). Such rules reduce the
amount of earnings that managers may be able to divert as private benefits and hence also the
amount that active monitoring may salvage from managerial expropriation.
Examples of substitutes can also be found in regulations other than corporate and securities
laws. For example, to the extent that a large shareholder does not or cannot participate in
private benefit extraction, his return from monitoring decreases with the level of the corporate
tax rates. In addition, the enforcement of tax rules can affect the insiders’ ability to expro-
priate shareholders and hence the returns from monitoring. Clearly, an outside shareholder’s
return from scrutinizing self-dealing transactions is lower when the tax authority enforces the
requirement that insiders have to transact with the firm on the same terms as could be obtained
in open market purchases.
9
More generally, regulatory agencies fulfil a monitoring function,
thereby providing a substitute to private monitoring.
10
Undoubtedly, not all rules pertaining to shareholder protection can be classified as either
substitute or complement to monitoring.
11
First, the regulation of some specific corporate
actions or decisions contains provisions that are both. For instance, some rules concerning self-
dealing transactions are better thought of as substitutes, such as the ban of personal loans to
executives,
12
while others facilitate private monitoring such as the requirements for executives
to report their trading in the firm’s shares (§ 403, Sarbanes-Oxley Act). Second, there are
rules that are difficult to interpret in terms of complements or substitutes. For example, rules
governing the compositions of the board and its committees seem to be aimed to hinder collusion
among corporate insiders. It seems difficult to ascertain whether say the separation of CEO
and chairman as recommended by several corporate governance codes increases or reduces the
need (cost) for outside monitoring. Notwithstanding such ambiguities, the examples illustrate
that both interpretations are empirically meaningful. Moreover, our analysis will show that the
rule (Rule 14a-8 of the 1934 Security Exchange Act) permits a shareholder only one proposal per year and
bars proposals in three key areas; director nominations, statements in opposition to management proposals,
and alternatives to management proposals (Black 1990). France and the U.K. grant shareholders more decision
rights. For example, both countries permit shareholder proposals against the opposition of the board and require
that shareholders approve the appointment of the company’s auditors and the distribution or reinvestment of
earnings (Kraakman et al. 2003).
9
Dyck and Zingales (2004) find that better tax enforcement, as measured by the degree of tax compliance,
reduces private benefits.
10
So far, only few corporate governance papers examine the effectiveness of public and private enforcement.
La Porta et al. (2004) and Barth et al. (2003) find that relying on private enforcement rather than government-
enforced regulation seems to be more conducive to the development of stock market and banking sector.
11
Such difficulties already arise when trying to assess the extent of shareholder protection provided by various
laws. Many rules pertaining to the governance of (public) firms are not easily interpretable as either strengthening
shareholder protection or favoring management (La Porta et al. 1998).
12
Until recently, credit transactions between a company and its executives were prohibited in the U.K., France
and Italy, but not in the U.S. (Enriques 2000). Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (§ 402) loans to executives are
now also banned in the U.S.
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distinction between the two interpretations is relevant because the relationship between legal
rules and monitoring has an impact on the ultimate shape of the relationship between law and
ownership concentration.
Finally, to highlight the interaction between monitoring and legal shareholder protection
we restrict attention to parameter constellations where the benefit of monitoring depends on
the quality of the law.
Assumption 2 φ(0, γ¯) < c/pΠ < φ(0, γ)
Assumption 2 rules out constellations where monitoring is either never or always beneficial,
irrespective of the quality of the law. Monitoring is never beneficial when the expected private
benefits are insufficient to induce managerial effort even in the weakest legal environment and
in the absence of monitoring (φ(0, γ) < c/pΠ). Similarly, monitoring is always beneficial when
the expected private benefits exceed the effort cost also in the strongest legal environment
unless the large shareholder monitors (φ(0, γ¯) > c/pΠ).
3 Monitoring and Legal Protection
In this section we abstract from the possibility of collusion and assume that private benefits
are not transferable. We begin the analysis by examining the impact of legal protection on the
manager’s incentives to exert effort and on the large shareholder’s incentives to monitor for
a given ownership structure α and a compensation rate w. We then analyse the relationship
between the quality of law and the optimal compensation and ownership concentration and
further illustrate our results with the help of specific functional forms.
In our model, there are two dimensions of moral hazard. First, the manager must exert
a non contractible effort e = 1 to find a new project. Second, if a new project is found and
undertaken, the manager can appropriate (part of) the proceeds rather than pay them out to
shareholders. Such managerial expropriation is constrained by both legal shareholder protection
and monitoring. Limiting the manager’s private benefits, whether through monitoring or by
law, comes also at a cost because it reduces the manager’s incentives to exert effort in the first
place. To preserve managerial initiative, the large shareholder has to commit not to monitor
excessively in a given legal environment. He can achieve this goal by dispersing (some of)
the shares to small investors because the size of his block determines the monitoring intensity
(Burkart et al. 1997). Since legal protection also limits the manager’s expected private benefits,
the size of the block that avoids excessive monitoring depends on the quality of the law. In
addition (or instead) of granting the manager private benefits, he may be offered a higher
salary.
10
3.1 Substitutes and Complements
Solving the game by backward induction, we begin with the date 3 resource allocation decision.
When the project is undertaken, total proceeds Π are available. The law shields a fraction
[1−
¯
φ(0, γ)] of the proceeds from private benefit extraction. That is, the amount [1−
¯
φ(0, γ)]Π
must be paid out either as dividends to shareholders or as remuneration to the manager. How
the remaining
¯
φ(0, γ)Π are allocated depends on monitoring. When the large shareholder





As the large shareholder, by assumption, cannot reap any private benefits, he imposes that
none of it is diverted. More specifically, he either proposes φ = φ(m,γ) or rejects any offer





to [1 − w − φ(0, γ)]Π as dividends. The professional manager retains full discretion over the
residual project proceeds
¯
φ(m,γ)Π and extracts all as private benefits.
Since private benefit extraction is efficient, shareholders cannot gain from using monetary
incentives to resolve the conflict over the resource allocation. To induce the manager to abstain
from extracting an additional dollar, shareholders would have to offer him a one-dollar transfer.
By contrast, a monetary transfer can help to resolve the effort problem when private benefits
are insufficient to compensate the manager for his effort cost c. We assume that the manager
is protected by limited liability, thereby excluding penalties. Limited liability and the binary
payoff structure {0,Π} imply that the optimal scheme entails a positive remuneration only if
the project is undertaken. This is equivalent to condition the manager’s remuneration on a
positive dividend payment. Given that the manager’s compensation is performance-based, we
refer to it as bonus.
At date 2, the large shareholder chooses his monitoring intensity m ≥ 0 after having ob-
served the manager’s effort choice. If the manager does not exert effort, the project is never
undertaken and monitoring is of no value. If the manager exerts effort e = 1, the large share-
holder maximizes his total return
α[1−w − φ(m,γ)]pΠ−C(m)
He receives a fraction α of the project proceeds that are paid out net of the manager’s
bonus and incurs monitoring costs C(m). The subsequent analysis implicitly assumes that









Decreasing marginal returns to monitoring (Assumption 1) and the convexity of C(m)
ensure the uniqueness of mˆ(α, γ). A larger block induces the large shareholder to monitor more
11
because he benefits more from forcing the manager to disgorge more proceeds as dividends.
The relationship between monitoring intensity and legal protection is not as straightforward
but depends on the role of the law.
Proposition 1 For a given block α the large shareholder’s monitoring intensity increases (de-
creases) with the quality of the law when legal protection and monitoring are complements
(substitutes).



























Since the denominator is positive, ∂mˆ/∂γ is positive (negative) when the cross-derivative
∂
2
φ(m,γ)/∂m∂γ is negative (positive). A positive cross-derivative implies that the marginal
impact of monitoring decreases when legal protection improves. That is, the law directly re-
stricts the possibilities for managerial expropriation and is therefore a substitute for active
monitoring. Consequently, the large shareholder monitors less for a given block α when legal
protection becomes stronger. When ∂
2
φ(m,γ)/∂m∂γ < 0 holds, the marginal effectiveness of
monitoring is enhanced by improvements in the law, and the large shareholder monitors more
for a given block α.
Given the monitoring intensity m and the consequent date 3 resource allocation, the man-
ager’s incentive constraint is
[w+
¯
φ(m,γ)]pΠ ≥ c (2)
The manager exerts effort e = 1 at date 1 only if the sum of the expected bonus and private
benefits exceeds the effort cost. High levels of monitoring and strong legal protection reduce
the manager’s expected private benefits and may discourage him from exerting effort, while the
bonus has the opposite effect. Thus, higher ownership concentration and better legal protection
aggravate the manager’s incentive problem whereas a higher bonus mitigates it.
We denote by m¯(γ) the level of monitoring such that the manager’s incentive constraint
binds. This maximum amount of monitoring increases with the bonus and decreases with the
quality of the law.
3.2 Optimal Ownership Structure and Legal Protection
The objective when choosing the ownership concentration and the bonus at date 0 is to max-
imize total shareholder wealth net of monitoring costs. This implicitly assumes that the own-
ership structure is chosen at the same time as a (new) professional manager is hired (who does
12








subject to the manager’s incentive constraint (equation 2) and the large shareholder’s first
order condition (equation 1).
Denote by γ˜ the value of γ such that the manager’s incentive constraint binds with a zero
bonus and in the absence of monitoring, i.e., such that
¯
φ(0, γ)pΠ = c holds. Uniqueness of
γ˜ follows from Assumption 1, while Assumption 2 ensures that γ˜ ∈ (γ, γ¯). The shareholders’
optimization problem has the following solution.












, γ) = pΠ− c.
ii) For γ < γ˜ and
¯
φ(mˆ(1, γ), γ)pΠ ≤ c, α
∗















, γ) = pΠ− c−C(m
∗
).
iii) For γ < γ˜ and
¯











, γ) = [1−
¯
φ(mˆ(1, γ), γ)]pΠ−C(mˆ(1, γ)).
The key to the intuition of Lemma 1 is the fact that shareholder net wealth V increases
with the ownership concentration and decreases with the bonus, provided that the manager’s
















From the large shareholder’s first order condition and the decreasing marginal returns from
monitoring it follows that the term in the square bracket is positive. Since monitoring increases
in the large shareholder’s stake ∂V/∂α > 0 holds for all α < 1. The inverse relationship between
shareholder wealth and bonus is immediate (∂V/∂w = −pΠ < 0).
Clearly, a binding incentive constraint is in the shareholders’ interest because managerial
rents come at their expense. It is, however, not always possible to avoid leaving a rent to
the manager. More precisely, if
¯
φ(mˆ(1, γ), γ)pΠ > c the incentive compatibility constraint
(equation 2) does not bind even with a zero bonus and a fully concentrated ownership, i.e.,
maximum monitoring. In this range of legal protection (case iii), the optimal ownership is fully
concentrated (α
∗
= 1) and the bonus w
∗
is zero, but the manager extracts nonetheless a rent
R =
¯
φ(mˆ(1, γ), γ)pΠ − c. Shareholders receive the fraction of the expected project proceeds
that the law and monitoring shield from expropriation, net of the monitoring cost.
Otherwise (cases i and ii), there always exists a combination of ownership concentration




φ(m,γ)]pΠ = c into the objective function (equation 3) yields
V = pΠ− c−C(m)
Thus, it is optimal to minimize the level of monitoring while leaving the manager’s incentive
constraint binding. For γ ≥ γ˜, expected private benefits are insufficient to induce managerial
effort even in the absence of monitoring. In this case the optimal ownership is fully dispersed
and the manager is offered a bonus that covers the difference between effort cost and expected
private benefits. Total shareholder wealth is at its highest possible level V = pΠ− c.
For γ < γ˜, legal protection is insufficient to prevent the manager from extracting private
benefits in excess of his effort cost. As a result, the large shareholder has to monitor the
manager. Moreover, setting the bonus to zero minimizes the level of monitoring that keeps
the manager’s incentive constraint binding. Shareholder wealth is equal to expected project
proceeds net of the manager’s effort cost and the monitoring cost.
13
A last remark related to Lemma 1 concerns the condition separating cases (ii) and (iii).
The issue is that there may be more than one γ value such that
¯
φ(mˆ(1, γ), γ)pΠ = c holds.


















From Proposition 1 we know that the sign of ∂mˆ/∂γ is ambiguous. When legal protection
and monitoring are complements (∂mˆ/∂γ > 0), both terms are negative and a unique threshold
value of γ exists that separates case (ii) from case (iii). In contrast, when legal protection and





φ(mˆ(1, γ), γ) is indeterminate. This implies that the
set of γ values such that
¯
φ(mˆ(1, γ), γ)pΠ ≤ (>)c need not be convex.
Summarizing the above discussion, the ownership structure and the bonus are chosen to
solve the dual moral hazard problem of providing incentives and limiting managerial expropri-
ation. How these two instruments are put to use depends on the quality of the law.
Proposition 2 When legal protection is good (γ ≥ γ˜) a fully dispersed ownership and a positive
bonus are optimal (α
∗
= 0 and w
∗
> 0). Otherwise (γ < γ˜), outside ownership concentration
and a zero bonus are optimal (α
∗
> 0 and w
∗
= 0).
The prospect of extracting private benefits provides incentives for the manager to exert
effort. Because these private benefits decrease with the quality of the law, bonus and moni-
toring both have a role. When legal protection is good (γ ≥ γ˜), letting the manager extract
13
Once the manager has exerted effort, a higher monitoring intensity reduces the private benefit extraction
by the manager, and net shareholder return increases with the block size. The (large shareholder’s) incentives
to increase ownership concentration ex post can be eliminated by compensating the manager with a ”bonus”
conditioned on the final block size.
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private benefits is part of the efficient compensation package that needs to be complemented
with a bonus. The ownership structure is fully dispersed because each dollar salvaged from
managerial expropriation through monitoring would have to be paid as bonus in order to satisfy
the manager’s incentive constraint. When legal protection is weak (γ < γ˜) (partial) ownership
concentration restricts managerial expropriation. A bonus is not offered since it would merely
require more costly monitoring (or concede a rent to the manager). Thus, bonus and ownership
concentration do not coexist in equilibrium.
The ownership predictions of Proposition 2 are corroborated by the empirical evidence. La
Porta et al. (1999) among others find that widely held firms are more common in countries
with good shareholder protection. Also, dispersed ownership of medium-sized firms (those with
market valuations near, but above, $500million) is prevalent only in the U.S. and U.K. both of
which come out on top in cross-country comparisons of legal shareholder protection.
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Proposition 2 and Lemma 1 have also implications for the bonus in regimes with good legal
protection (γ ≥ γ˜). As explained, abstaining from monitoring minimizes the bonus necessary
to satisfy the manager’s incentive constraint. This bonus depends on the quality of the law.
Corollary 1 In regimes with good legal protection (γ ≥ γ˜) the bonus increases with the quality
of legal protection.
Given that dispersed shareholders do not monitor, the bonus exactly covers the difference







and positively correlated with the quality of the law (dw/dγ = −d
¯
φ/dγ > 0). Since the
manager’s incentive constraint binds, the bonus has to increase as legal protection improves
to compensate for the lower private benefits. Thus, Corollary 1 implies that the composition
rather than the total expected payoff [
¯
φ(0, γ) +w]pΠ varies with the quality of the law. That
is, the ratio of agreed bonus to extracted private benefits increases with the quality of the law.
Given that the private benefits are less easily observable, Corollary 1 predicts higher managerial
compensations in countries with better legal protection. This is consistent with the evidence
that managerial compensation is substantially higher in the U.S. than in Continental Europe
and Japan (Murphy 1998). In a recent cross-country study Bryan et al. (2003) document that
the primary factors explaining variations in executive compensation are the size of the debt
14
While ownership patterns are heterogeneous across as well as within countries, our model implies a unique
optimal ownership structure for a given quality of the law (γ value). Himmelberg et al. (2001) argue that the
ease with which corporate resources can be diverted also depends on firm-specific characteristics such as R&D
expenditures. Their study documents that firm-specific variables are indeed statistically significant predictors
of ownership concentration. Introducing firm characteristics as an additional determinant of private benefit
extraction is an extension of our model that would yield diverse ownership patterns within countries.
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market and the quality of legal protection. In particular, they find that executive compensation
is more equity-based (e.g., includes more stock options) in countries with stronger shareholder
protection.
We now turn to the relationship between ownership concentration and legal shareholder




Proposition 3 i) When legal protection and monitoring are complements, weaker legal pro-
tection goes together with more concentrated ownership.
ii) When legal protection and monitoring are substitutes, weaker legal protection may imply a
more or a less concentrated ownership.
































Given that the denominator is negative, the sign of dα
∗
/dγ is determined by the sign of
the numerator. Since managerial extraction is decreasing in monitoring and in legal protection
(∂
¯
φ/∂m < 0 and ∂
¯
φ/∂γ < 0), ownership concentration decreases as legal protection improves,




φ/∂m∂γ < 0 implies ∂m/∂γ > 0). Moreover, ownership concentration is (weakly) decreasing
in legal protection: Initially, when legal protection is very strong, ownership is fully dispersed.
As legal protection becomes weaker (γ ≤ γ˜) ownership becomes more and more concentrated
and may eventually become fully concentrated. Thus, a strictly inverse relationship between
legal shareholder protection and outside ownership concentration obtains when the marginal
effectiveness of monitoring is increasing with the quality of the law.




the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration becomes more complex.
It is still true that for very strong legal protection ownership is dispersed, but two conflicting
effects shape the relationship between ownership concentration and the law. On the one hand,
a reduction in legal protection entails larger private benefits and hence increases the maximum
level of monitoring that is compatible with managerial incentives (m¯(γ)). Ceteris paribus,
this translates into a more concentrated ownership structure. On the other hand, weaker
legal protection also increases the large shareholder’s return from monitoring for a given stake
α. Since more monitoring reduces the manager’s expected private benefits, it discourages
managerial initiative, and the increased monitoring incentives have to be curtailed by reducing
ownership concentration.
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If the effect of weaker legal protection on managerial incentives dominates the effect on
monitoring incentives, the optimal outside ownership concentration has to increase in order to
avoid leaving rents to the manager, i.e., to restore a binding incentive constraint. Conversely,
when the monitoring effect of weaker protection is stronger than the extraction effect, the
large shareholder’s stake has to be reduced to satisfy the manager’s incentive constraint. It
is, however, not possible to determine for which γ values the derivative dα
∗
/dγ is positive or
negative, unless further restrictions are imposed such as specific functional forms (see the next
section).
We would like to emphasize that such a non-monotonic relationship between ownership
concentration and legal protection does not conflict with the view that weaker legal rules
require more monitoring. In fact, it is easy to see that the maximum level of monitoring that
preserves managerial incentives is inversely related to the quality of the law. In equilibrium
the condition
¯
φ(mˆ, γ)pΠ = c holds. When the law becomes weaker, private benefits increase,
and a higher monitoring intensity is required to restore the equality. Thus, our model concurs
with the argument that more monitoring improves the return on equity when legal protection is
weak. In addition, it offers an alternative interpretation: Only regimes of weak legal protection
allow for close monitoring. In regimes with good protection, frequent shareholder interference
would frustrate managerial initiative.
Our result of a non-monotonic relationship differs from the common view because it accounts
for the impact of legal rules on the incentives to monitor. When weaker shareholder protection
increases the large shareholder’s monitoring incentives, implementing the higher optimal level
of monitoring may require a higher or lower outside ownership concentration.
The comparative static predictions of our theory (Proposition 3) are mute on the question
how the optimal ownership structure adapts to a change in legal protection. We discuss this
issue informally, outside of our static model. Suppose an unanticipated legal reform has taken
place that increases the optimal ownership concentration. The adjustment may, however, not
take place because the share value (dividend level) depends on the monitoring intensity, and
hence the ultimate size of the large shareholder’s block. The extent to which frictions hinder
the adjustment depends on how the gains are shared among large and small shareholders, which
in turn depends on the trading environment. When trading is not anonymous, fully rational
small shareholders free-ride on the share value improvement and only sell their shares at a price
equal to the post-acquisition share value. Consequently, the large shareholder does not gain
from increasing his block. Moreover, the increase in the monitoring costs due to a larger final
block exceeds the value increase of the shares initially owned by the large shareholder. Thus,
no adjustment takes place in a fully transparent setting.
15
15
A proof of a similar result can be found in Burkart et al. (1997) and Pagano and Röell (1998).
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By contrast, complete adjustment takes place when the large shareholder can purchases
shares at the pre-acquisition value, say because trading is anonymous and small shareholders
are myopic and do not anticipate the subsequent increase in share value. Given that the large
shareholder appropriates all the value improvement of the purchased shares, he has sufficient
incentives to adjust his block. More plausible than the two polar cases is a setting where some
investors are not fully rational and trade for liquidity or life cycle motives. As shown by Kyle
and Vila (1991), the presence of noise traders enables the large shareholder to hide, at least
partially, his identity and to buy some shares at a profitable price.
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Matters are much simpler when the large shareholder can share some of the private benefits
with the manager. As we will show later, the minority share value (dividend level) depends
in this case only on the law. Following an unanticipated legal change, the minority share
value adjusts, but remains thereafter the same, irrespective of the large shareholder’s trading
activities. Thus, any small shareholder is willing to trade with the large shareholder or any other
party at the price equal to the minority share value. Facing a perfectly elastic (net) supply,
the large shareholder gains from adjusting his block to the new optimal size. Or putting it
differently, since the appropriation of private benefits is not plagued by a free-rider problem,
the adjustment of the ownership structure occurs without frictions.
Summing up, there are gains from adapting the monitoring intensity to a change in legal
shareholder protection. The required adjustment is, however, subject to frictions because the
large shareholder who bears the adjustment costs may have to share the gains with the small
investors. In general, we would expect at least some gradual adjustment because noise trading
and collusion with the management enable the large shareholder to appropriate part of these
gains. In support of this conclusion, Kole and Lehn (1999) document a gradual increase in
outside blockholdings in the U.S. airline industry following its deregulation in 1978 which
increased the importance of the managerial role and the need to monitor management.
3.3 Examples
As shown above, the relationship between outside ownership concentration and legal protection
depends on how legal provisions and monitoring interact. The subsequent examples aim at
providing further intuition for the two cases of Proposition 3.
A straightforward example of legal protection being a complement to monitoring is the case
where the monitoring costs C(.) rather than (the ease of) private benefit extraction φ(.) depend
inversely on the quality of the law. More precisely, suppose that φ = φ(m) and C = C(m,γ)
with ∂C/∂γ ≤ 0 and ∂
2
C/∂m∂γ ≤ 0. Totally differentiating the large shareholder’s optimal
16
Croci (2004) provides evidence that activist blockholders do indeed accumulate blocks through open market
purchases.
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C/∂m∂γ ≤ 0 it follows that monitoring increases with the quality of legal protection
(∂mˆ/∂γ > 0). Since φ(.) only depends on the monitoring intensity, this result implies that out-
side ownership concentration and legal protection are inversely related (dα
∗
/dγ < 0). Stricter
legal rules reduce the scope for managerial extraction and the large shareholder’s monitoring
cost. That is, the optimal monitoring intensity and the block size necessary to implement a
given monitoring intensity decrease when legal protection becomes stronger. As the monitoring
effect of an improvement in legal protection reinforces the extraction effect, outside ownership
concentration decreases when legal protection improves. Obviously, this result also holds in
the absence of the monitoring effect. When the quality of the law has no impact on the (mar-
ginal) effectiveness of monitoring (∂
2
φ(m,γ)/∂m∂γ = 0), monitoring only depends on the size
of the large shareholder’s stake. Hence, ownership concentration decreases as legal protection
becomes better to implement the required reduction in the monitoring intensity.
Arguably, much of the empirical law and finance literature - implicitly or explicitly - pre-
supposes that monitoring and legal protection are substitutes.
17
In view of this presumption
the non-monotonic relationship between outside ownership concentration and legal protection
(part ii) of Proposition 3) seems of particular interest. The purpose of the subsequent example
is to show that this result does not rely on restrictive or unusual assumptions.
Assume that legal shareholder protection γ imposes an upper bound 1− γ on the fraction
of proceeds that can be diverted (at no cost) where γ ∈ [0, 1]. The monitoring intensity m
reduces the fraction of proceeds that are not protected by the law from expropriation by m.
Hence, the amount of proceeds that the manager can freely allocate is given by (1−γ)(1−m)Π.
For simplicity, the large shareholder’s monitoring cost are C = m
2
/2 and pΠ < 1 to ensure
interior solutions for the monitoring intensity. Finally, we abstract from the possibility that
the manager can obtain a rent even though ownership is fully concentrated. To exclude this
outcome (case iii in Lemma 1) we impose c > 1/4.
When the project is undertaken, the manager extracts all the residual proceeds over which
he has full discretion as private benefits. Thus, given that the large shareholder monitors at
date 2 with intensity m, the manager obtains (1− γ)(1−m)Π (plus the bonus wΠ), whereas
the shareholders realize a payoff [γ+m(1−γ)−w]Π. At date 2, the large shareholder monitors
17
Lins (2003) states that ”..ownership concentration coincides with a lack of investor protection because owners
who are not protected from controllers will seek to protect themselves by becoming controllers.” See also the
quote from La Porta et al. (1998) in the introduction of the paper.
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if the manager has exerted effort at date 1, maximizing his total return
α [γ +m(1− γ)−w] pΠ−m
2
/2.
The monitoring intensity chosen by the large shareholder is thus
mˆ(α, γ) = α(1− γ)pΠ
with ∂mˆ/∂α = (1 − γ)pΠ > 0 and ∂mˆ/∂γ = −αpΠ < 0. A larger stake and a lower quality
of legal protection induce the large shareholder to monitor more. Thus, legal shareholder
protection and monitoring are substitutes as the marginal return from monitoring decreases
with the quality of the law (high γ values).
Given m and (1− γ) the manager exerts effort at date 1 only if
m ≤ m¯(γ) ≡
((1− γ) +w)pΠ− c
(1− γ)pΠ
The maximum level of monitoring that preserves managerial incentives decreases with the
quality of the law (dm¯/dγ < 0). If the manager exerts effort e = 1, total net shareholder wealth
is equal to
V = [γ +m(1− γ)−w] pΠ−m
2
/2
As in the general case, the optimal ownership structure is as concentrated and the bonus is as
small as possible, subject to the condition mˆ(α, γ) ≤ m¯(γ).








= 0, and V = pΠ− c.
ii) For γ < 1− c/pΠ, α
∗








= 1− c/[(1− γ)pΠ],
and V = pΠ− c− (1− c/[(1− γ)pΠ])
2
/2.
When legal protection is good, expected private benefits have to be complemented with
a bonus to satisfy the manager’s incentive constraint. Otherwise, private benefits exceed the
manager’s effort cost and monitoring is necessary to reduce managerial expropriation.
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To examine how legal protection affects the optimal ownership concentration we restrict
attention to the case where α
∗










For γ > 1−2c/pΠ we obtain dα
∗
/dγ < 0 whereas dα
∗
/dγ > 0 for γ < 1−2c/pΠ. Thus, the
relationship is indeed non monotone, confirming part (ii) of Proposition 3 when monitoring
18
The assumption c > 1/4 implies that mˆ(1, γ) > m¯(γ). Thus, there always exists a combination of ownership
concentration and bonus such that the manager’s incentive compatibility constraint binds.
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and legal protection are substitutes. The intuition for the ambiguous net effect is perhaps best
understood by examining the condition for the optimal ownership concentration. The optimal
block size satisfies the condition mˆ(α, γ) = m¯(γ), i.e., α(1−γ)pΠ = 1−c/[(1−γ)pΠ]. A decrease
in γ increases both sides of the condition. If the extraction effect dominates the monitoring
effect, the ownership concentration has to increase to restore the equality. This holds when γ
is in the interval [1− 2c/pΠ, 1− c/pΠ]. In this case, a larger outside block goes together with
weaker legal protection. The reverse holds for γ < 1−2c/pΠ. In such regimes a decrease in the
quality of the law has a stronger effect on monitoring incentives than on managerial incentives,
and a less concentrated ownership goes together with weaker legal protection.
4 Evidence
Cross-country studies document that ownership is typically more concentrated in countries with
weaker legal shareholder protection (Denis and McConnell, 2003).
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These findings suggest an
inverse relationship between ownership concentration and legal protection. In contrast, we ar-
gue that the relationship between outside ownership concentration and legal protection is more
intricate because legal protection also affects the outside blockholders’ monitoring incentives
and has thereby repercussions on the ownership structure. Most notably, our theory predicts
a non-monotone relationship between outside ownership and the quality of legal protection for
rules that are substitutes for monitoring. This prediction is counter to the common empirical
findings in most studies. These studies are, however, not directly applicable to Proposition 3.
In particular, cross-country ownership studies typically focus on the largest shareholder
20
and do either not distinguish between inside and outside ownership concentration or define any
blockholder as insider who participates in management or who owns more than say 20 percent
of the shares. In contrast, we consider a blockholder as an outsider, unless he is an executive
officer, e.g., the CEO. Moreover, our theory presupposes outside blockholdings. Hence, it
cannot offer predictions about how the quality of the legal protection affects the likelihood
of outside rather than inside ownership concentration. Accordingly, the prevalence of inside
ownership in countries with poor legal protection is evidence orthogonal to our theory.
21
Also, most comparative studies use as a measure of legal shareholder protection a cumulative
index, commonly the anti-director rights index developed by La Porta et al. (1998). Our theory
19
The law and finance literature continues the large literature on the effects of ownership structure on corporate
decisions and firm value. The numerous single-country studies, most often on the U.S., yield conflicting results
and the relation between ownership structure and performance is very much the subject of an ongoing debate.
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A recent exception is Lins (2003) who examines the relationship between firm value and ownership across
18 emerging markets. He reports a positive impact of non-management blockholders on firm value but he does
not explicitly link the size of these blocks to the quality of legal protection.
21
For instance, Claessens et al. (2002) report that managers and their families are the largest shareholders in
about two-thirds of 1300 publicly traded companies in eight East Asian economies.
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implies that the relationship between outside ownership and legal protection depends on the
overall quality of the law and on the nature of the various rules. In particular, we predict
an unambiguously negative impact of rules that facilitate monitoring, while rules that are a
substitute to monitoring can have a positive or negative effect on the ownership concentration.
Accordingly, testing Proposition 3 requires (at least) two separate measures of legal shareholder
protection, one composed of complementing rules and another composed of substituting rules.
In fact, La Porta et al. (1998) find that better accounting standards have a negative effect
on ownership concentration while the mandatory dividend rule has a positive effect. Our
theory can explain why two rules that both reduce the ease with which shareholders can be
expropriated have opposite effects on the ownership concentration.
For the most part, ownership studies do not provide sufficiently detailed or disaggregated
evidence to be a suitable test of Proposition 3. Notwithstanding, there is some evidence that
suggests deviations from an inverse relationship between ownership concentration and legal
shareholder protection. First, Faccio et al. (2001) examine the dividend policy in nine East
Asian and five Western European countries. They report that Western European corporations
have a more concentrated ownership structure and pay higher dividends. To the extent that
higher dividends are a reflection of better shareholder protection, as argued by la Porta et al.
(2000a), this finding is inconsistent with an inverse relationship between law and ownership
concentration.
Second, two developments in Eastern and Central Europe are also not easily reconciled
with an inverse relationship. On the one hand, legal changes during the 1990s raised the
quality of legal shareholder protection in most transition economies from a level well below the
world average to a level that is within close range of the average common law country (Pistor
2000). On the other hand, the transition economies experienced an increase in ownership
concentration during this period. For instance, the blocks held by outsiders and managers
increased substantially in Russia during the late 90s (Biletsky et al., 2002; Sprenger, 2001).
The blocks of the largest and second largest shareholder also increased in Poland, Estonia, and
Slovakia (Dzierzanowski and Tamowicz, 2001; Olsson and Alasheyeva, 2000). Commentators
usually view the increased concentration as a correction of the dispersed ownership created
through the mass privatizations. This interpretation complements rather than excludes an
interpretation along the lines of Proposition 3. Non-management blockholdings may also have
increased, particularly during the late 90s, to provide or maintain monitoring incentives after
legal reform had improved shareholder protection.
Third, examining the evolution of Italian firms traded on the Milan Stock Exchange Aganin
and Volpin (2003) document a non-monotonic relationship between legal investor protection and
ownership concentration (and financial market development). While legal investor protection
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improved since World War II in Italy, the largest shareholder owned on average about 45 percent
of the votes in 1947, 55 percent in 1987, and 47 percent in 2000. According to the authors,
this evolution of the ownership structure is largely inconsistent with the law and finance view
that ownership concentration acts as a (partial) substitute for lacking institutional governance
mechanisms. They propose political economy arguments to account for the observed non-
monotonic relationship between ownership concentration and legal protection. The present
paper shows that this may be a hasty conclusion because deviations from an inverse relationship
are not incompatible with a law and finance explanation.
Since Aganin and Volpin focus on the largest shareholder’s voting and cash flow rights
without separating management and non-management blockholders, their study is not a direct
test of Proposition 3. One of their findings is, however, of interest or even suggestive. The
return rights held on average by the largest shareholder was 40.38 percent in 1947, 42.11 per-
cent in 1987, and 51.31 percent in 2000. The increase between 1987 and 2000 is particularly
noteworthy because Italy strengthened its legal investor protection substantially in 1998. The
so-called Draghi’s law improved Italy’s anti-director rights index from 1 to 5 (out of a possible
6). To the extent that non-management blockholders own these shares, this observed concen-
tration of return rights is evidence in support of our result that legal protection and ownership
concentration can be complements (Proposition 3, part ii).
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5 Collusion
Large shareholders can be effective monitors, but they can also use their influence to extract
private benefits. Indeed, both sides are documented in numerous studies, though the net impact
of large shareholders on firm value remains disputed (Denis and McConnell, 2003). Accordingly,
the relevance of Proposition 3 depends upon whether it also holds when the interests of the
blockholder diverge from those of the small shareholders.
5.1 Transferable private benefits
In section 3 private benefits are by assumption not transferable, which is tantamount to assum-
ing that the large and small shareholders have perfectly congruent interests. Here we consider
the other extreme, where private benefits are perfectly transferable, thereby aligning the large
shareholder’s interests with those of the manager. When the large shareholder can share the
private benefits, monitoring is no longer a public good, the benefit of which are shared by
all shareholders. Instead, monitoring becomes a rent-seeking activity that serves to raise the
22
For instance, the Agnelli family owned (through its holding companies Ifi and Ifil) 21 percent of equity
capital of Fiat in 1995 and 30 percent by the end of 2002. These numbers are taken from La Porta et al. (1999)
and the website of the commissione nazionale per le societa e la borsa (www.consob.it).
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blockholder’s share of the private benefits.
To solve the game with transferable private benefits we repeat the analytical steps of section
3. Provided that the project has been undertaken, proceeds Π are allocated at date 3. Since
the law stipulates that (1 −
¯
φ(0, γ))Π are paid out as dividends or salary, the manager and
the large shareholder bargain over the remaining
¯
φ(0, γ)Π. Given Nash bargaining, the large
shareholder (manager) receives his outside option plus a fraction 1−ψ (ψ) of the surplus. The
payoff that each party obtains if the bargaining breaks down - the outside option - corresponds
to the payoff with non-transferable private benefits. Given that the large shareholder monitors










φ(m,γ))Π. The manager’s outside option is then
¯
φ(m,γ)Π, the amount over which
he retains full discretion. Since bargaining is efficient, the large shareholder and the manager
always agree to extract the maximum level of private benefits given the legal constraints, i.e.
¯
φ(0, γ)Π. Thus, the large shareholder’s payoff in the bargaining is








and the manager’s payoff in the bargaining amounts to
[
¯







At date 2, the large shareholder monitors only if the manager exerts effort at date 1. Having






























The right-hand side of the first order condition reveals the two motives for monitoring. The
first term corresponds to monitoring in the absence of collusion (equation 1). It reflects the
monitoring incurred to protect the large shareholder’s block from expropriation by the manager.
The second term captures the additional monitoring that the large shareholder undertakes to
appropriate a larger share of the private benefits.
Note that the large shareholder monitors only to protect himself. From the small share-
holders’ perspective monitoring is a pure rent-seeking activity, since the large shareholder and
the manager always agree to set φ =
¯
φ(0, γ). Thus, diverging interests among shareholders are
one reason why legal protection and monitoring differ. The law protects all shareholders from
expropriation by the manager, while the large shareholder stands up (monitors) for his own
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interests. He can protect his interests without simultaneously fending off minority shareholder
expropriation.
One implication of the disparate effect of monitoring is that large and small shareholders
have contrary preferences towards changes in legal protection. Given monitoring is a pure
rent-seeking activity, dividends only depend on the quality of the law. Hence, small sharehold-
ers support better laws as they result in an increase in share value. By contrast, the large
shareholder opposes such law-induced redistributions.
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As shown in the appendix, the comparative static properties of mˆ(α, γ) remain the same as
in the case with non transferable private benefits. Monitoring incentives increase with the block
size and with the quality of the law when legal protection and monitoring are complements,
but decrease with the quality of the law when legal protection and monitoring are substitutes.
The prospect of reaping private benefits implies that monitoring is positive even if the large
shareholder were to own no shares, i.e., mˆ(0, γ) > 0. The existence of a (large) shareholder
who does not own a block (α = 0) but is in a strong enough position to extract private benefits
seems implausible. One way to remove this mechanical feature of the model is to assume that
the large shareholder’s bargaining power depends on the size of his stake. Following Burkart
et al. (2003), we choose a simpler discrete formalization of this notion.
Assumption 3 If the large shareholder owns less than α < α he abstains from monitoring.
Unless the large shareholder owns a minimum stake he lacks the authority vis-à-vis the
manager to monitor effectively. In other words, owning less than α allows the large shareholder
to commit not to monitor and interfere.
At date 1, the manager exerts effort only if the bonus and his share of private benefits












pΠ ≥ c (5)
A more concentrated ownership stifles managerial incentives because it increases the incentives
to monitor and the share of private benefits that the large shareholder appropriates. Nonethe-
less, collusion promotes ceteris paribus managerial initiative. In addition to the private benefits
the manager appropriates in the absence of collusion (
¯
φ(mˆ, γ)pΠ), he receives the fraction ψ of







Besides reducing private benefits, better laws also make it easier for the large shareholder to control the
manager, i.e., increase the productivity of rent-seeking. In our view, this latter effect is unlikely to offset the loss
in private benefits, and large shareholders who collude with management are bound to be worse off from legal
improvements. This surely applies to improvements in minority shareholder protection such as equal treatment
provisions or liability standards (fiduciary duty) for large shareholders.
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The optimal bonus and ownership concentration obtain again from maximizing total net
shareholder wealth which includes the dividends paid out to all shareholders and the private
benefits accruing to the large shareholder minus the monitoring costs.
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Thus, the stake of the















subject to the constraint α ∈ ({0} ∪ [α, 1]) imposed by Assumption 3 and subject to the
incentive constraint of the manager (equation 5) and that of the large shareholder (equation
4).
The complete solution for the collusion case is given in the appendix (Lemma 3). Here we
offer a cursory discussion of how the quality of the law shapes the optimal bonus and ownership
structure. While collusion affects the rationale for monitoring it does not qualitatively change
the relationship between the law and the ownership concentration. In particular, when legal
protection is very strong or very weak, a dispersed ownership, respectively a fully concentrated
structure, remains optimal. In fact, in either case the solutions with transferable and non-
transferable private benefits coincide because the possibility of collusion does not matter in the
absence of either a large shareholder (α = 0) or of small shareholders (α = 1).
When legal protection is of intermediate quality, monitoring is - like in the no collusion case
- required to avoid leaving a rent to the manager. However, Assumption 3 complicates matter
as it imposes a discontinuity in the feasible monitoring intensity. In particular, the feasible
monitoring intensity may no longer be compatible with a binding incentive constraint and a
zero bonus. As a result, there are two constellations. First, the restriction α /∈ (0, α) is not a
binding constraint of the shareholders’ optimization problem. In this case, the optimal bonus is
zero, the large shareholder owns a block α ≥ α and monitors accordingly. Since collusion grants
the manager more private benefits for a given monitoring intensity, the large shareholder needs
to monitor more in order to avoid leaving a rent. Compared to the no collusion case, a more
concentrated ownership structure (larger α) is thus needed to make the manager’s incentive
constraint binding.
Second, the restriction α /∈ (0, α) binds, leaving the choice between under- and overmoni-
toring. On the one hand, a dispersed ownership (α < α) and no monitoring concede a rent to
the manager even with a zero bonus. On the other hand, the minimum block size α induces the
large shareholder to monitor with an intensity that violates the manager’s incentive constraint,
unless a positive bonus is offered. A dispersed ownership structure is the better option when
the sum of monitoring cost and bonus exceeds the managerial rent.
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Within our setting monitoring is a prerequisite for collusion as it forces the manager to share part of the
private benefits with the large shareholder. Thus, monitoring is a costly activity that adds value albeit not for
the dispersed shareholders; it increases the value of the block and thereby total shareholder return.
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Having characterized the optimal ownership structure, we can now address the relationship
between legal shareholder protection and ownership concentration when private benefits are
transferable. We focus again on the case where the shareholder’s optimization problem has
an interior solution with α
∗
∈ [α, 1) and w = 0. Such a solution implies that the manager’s























































As the denominator is negative the sign of dα
∗
/dγ coincides with the sign of the numerator.
The numerator has an ambiguous sign for the same reasons as in the case with non-transferable
private benefits. First, better legal protection reduces the ease with which the manager can
extract private benefits. To restore his incentives to exert effort, monitoring must decrease.
The extraction effect of better legal protection on the ownership concentration is always neg-
ative (∂
¯
φ(.)/∂γ < 0). Second, an improvement in legal protection also has an impact on the
large shareholder’s incentives to monitor (for a given block α). The monitoring effect on the
ownership concentration is reflected in the first term of the numerator (∂
¯
φ(.)/∂m · ∂m/∂γ).
When legal protection and monitoring are complements (∂m/∂γ > 0), this term is also neg-
ative, and the ownership concentration unambiguously decreases with the quality of the law.
In contrast, when legal protection and monitoring are substitutes, the relationship between
outside ownership concentration and the quality of the law is not monotone. If better legal
protection weakens managerial incentives more than monitoring incentives, outside ownership
concentration decreases to preserve managerial initiative. Conversely, if the monitoring effect
is stronger than the extraction effect, ownership concentration increases to avoid leaving a rent
to the manager.
Thus, our main result (Proposition 3) linking legal protection and ownership concentration
also holds when the manager and the large shareholder can collude at the expense of small
shareholders. The relationship between outside ownership concentration and legal protection
may be inverse or non-monotonic, contrary to the common view that law and ownership con-
centration are (always) substitutes. Our findings differ from this view because we explicitly
consider how legal rules and monitoring interact in curbing managerial extraction and how
changes in legal protection affect the monitoring incentives.
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5.2 Inefficient private benefit extraction
So far we have considered the two polar cases where the interests of the large shareholder are
either completely aligned with those of the small shareholders or with those of the manager.
The evidence that blockholders do both improve firm value and extract private benefits suggests
that the large shareholder’s interest tend to be partially aligned both with those of the manager
and with those of the small shareholders. To obtain such partial alignment within a formal
model, private benefits must be transferable and the extraction must involve a marginally
increasing dead-weight loss. Unless such an inefficient extraction technology is assumed, the
large shareholder always prefers a corner solution, i.e., he agrees to divert as much as possible
or he opposes extraction altogether as in the preceding sections.
Replacing an efficient with an inefficient extraction technology does not alter the result
that the relationship between ownership concentration and legal protection crucially depends
on whether legal rules and monitoring are complements or substitutes. In particular, a non-
monotonic relationship also obtains when legal protection and monitoring are substitutes, as
shown in an earlier version of this paper (Burkart and Panunzi 2001). In addition, inefficient
private benefit extraction allows to explore how (a change in) legal protection affects the conflict
of interest between the large and the small shareholders. This is the final issue that we want
to address.
To fix ideas suppose that the deadweight loss increases with the extent of extraction (φ).
Following La Porta et al. (2000b) assume further that better legal protection renders the
extraction technology less efficient. That is, the marginal deadweight loss increases with φ and
γ. Since bargaining between the large shareholder and the manager is efficient, they agree on
a level of extraction that maximizes their joint payoff, i.e., the sum of private benefits and of
the value of the large shareholder’s block α. Hence, their resource allocation decision takes
into account that they have to bear a fraction α of the cost of inefficient extraction. A larger
block implies that the large shareholder and the manager internalize more of the inefficiency
and extract less private benefits, thereby increasing the value of all shares. Thus, while the
large shareholder colludes with the manager at the expense of the small shareholders, a larger
block reduces the conflict among shareholders.
Similarly, private benefit extraction is also inversely related to the quality of the law. Since
better legal protection increases the deadweight loss, it reduces the incentives of a large share-
holder with a given block α to extract private benefits. This does, however, not imply that
better laws necessarily alleviate the conflict of interest among shareholders. The reason is that
better legal protection also affects the optimal ownership concentration α
∗
. In fact, both the
manager’s incentive to exert high effort and the large shareholder incentive to monitor are
affected by a change in the law.
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Consider the case where better legal protection goes together with a lower ownership con-
centration (dα
∗
/dγ < 0). To preserve managerial initiative, an improvement in legal protection
has to be matched with a reduction in the ownership concentration. Owning a smaller stake,
the large shareholder attaches more importance to private benefit extraction when choosing
φ. Thus, while better legal protection increases the inefficiency of private benefit extraction
it decreases the fraction of this cost that the large shareholder bears. When the latter effect
dominates the former better legal protection exacerbates rather than alleviates the conflict of
interests among shareholders.
In case better legal protection goes together with a more concentrated ownership structure
(dα
∗
/dγ > 0), better legal protection unambiguously alleviates the conflict of interests among
shareholders. Private benefit extraction is then less efficient and the large shareholder, owning
a larger block, internalizes a larger fraction of the deadweight loss, further reducing extraction.
6 Conclusion
This paper scrutinizes the hypothesis, first put forward by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998),
that outside ownership concentration and legal shareholder protection are substitutes. To this
end, we analyze the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives,
monitoring, and ownership in a setting where monitoring and legal shareholder protection comes
with costs and benefits. On the one hand, more monitoring or better legal protection reduce
the risk of expropriation by the manager. On the other hand, more shareholder control deprives
the manager of his private benefits, thereby reducing managerial initiative. Since managerial
initiative generates shareholder return, it can be advantageous to restrict monitoring by partly
dispersing share ownership and/or offer the manager a bonus when legal protection curtails
private benefit extraction.
As the literature emphasizes, legal shareholder protection affects the ease with which the
manager, possibly in collusion with the large shareholders, can divert corporate resources. We
argue that the quality of legal rules also shapes the large shareholders’ incentives to monitor.
Because monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relation-
ship between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates
monitoring better laws strengthen the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration and
legal protection are inversely related. By contrast, when legal protection and monitoring are
substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives, and the relationship between legal
protection and ownership concentration is non-monotonic. This holds irrespective of whether or
not the large shareholder can reap private benefits. Thus, our analysis shows that the assumed
relationship between monitoring and the law (substitutes or complements) is the decisive as-





A Analysis with Transferable Private Benefits












































As the denominator is positive, the sign of ∂mˆ/∂γ depends on ∂
2
φ(m,γ)/∂m∂γ. A positive
(negative) cross-derivative implies that ∂mˆ/∂γ is negative (positive).
A.2 Optimal Bonus and Ownership Concentration










, γ) = pΠ− c.
ii) For γ < γ˜,
¯
φ(mˆ(1, γ), γ)pΠ ≤ c, and
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, γ) = pΠ− c−C(mˆ(α, γ)).
iii) For γ < γ˜,
¯
φ(mˆ(1, γ), γ)pΠ ≤ c, and
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, γ) = pΠ− c−C(m
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iv)For γ < γ˜ and
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Proof: Abstract for the time being from the constraint α ∈ ({0} ∪ [α, 1]) imposed by As-
sumption 3 and suppose that the monitoring intensity is given by equation (4). Differentiating


































Moreover, ∂V/∂w = −pΠ < 0. If
¯
φ(mˆ(1, γ), γ)pΠ > c, the manager’s incentive constraint





= 0 (case iv).
For
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holds. Inserting this condition in equation (6) yields
V = pΠ− c−C(m).
Thus, maximizing net shareholder wealth requires to minimize the monitoring intensity subject
to equation (5). As in the Lemma 1, there are two possible situations: For γ ≥ γ˜, or equivalently
¯
φ(0, γ)pΠ ≤ c, m
∗
= 0 (and thus α
∗




φ(0, γ) (case i).
For γ < γ˜, the manager’s incentive constraint (equation 5) is slack for w = 0 and m = 0.
Hence, w should be set equal to zero and α such that
[
¯







pΠ = c. (7)
Whenever the α value that satisfies this condition falls in the range (0, α), it is not an admis-
sible solution because it violates the constraint α ∈ ({0} ∪ [α, 1]). Since the manager’s payoff












Given this condition holds, w
∗
= 0 and α
∗











pΠ < c, the solution to equation (7)
violates the constraint α ∈ ({0} ∪ [α, 1]) (case ii). There are two possibilities. Either to choose
α = 0, thereby abstaining from monitoring and conceding a rent R =
¯
φ(0, γ)pΠ − c to the











in which case V = pΠ− c−C(mˆ(α, γ)).
32
References
[1] Aganin, A., Volpin, P., 2003. History of corporate ownership in Italy. Working paper No.
17/2003, ECGI.
[2] Barth, J.R., Caprio, G.Jr., Levine, R., 2004. Bank regulation and supervision: what works
best? J. Finan. Intermediation 13, 205-240.
[3] Biletsky, S., Brown, J.D., Earle, J.S., Khaleeva, J., Komarova, I., Lazareva, O., Sabiri-
anova, K.Z., 2002. Inside the transforming firm. Upjohn Institute for Employment Re-
search.
[4] Black, B., 1990. Shareholder passivity reexamined. Mich. Law Rev. 89, 520-608.
[5] Bryan, St., Nash, R., Patel, A., 2003. The equity mix in executive compensation: an
investigation of cross-country differences. Wake Forest University.
[6] Burkart, M., Gromb, D., Panunzi, F., 1997. Large shareholders, monitoring, and the value
of the firm. Quart. J. Economics 112, 693-728.
[7] Burkart, M., Panunzi, F., 2001. Agency conflict, ownership concentration, and legal share-
holder protection. Discussion paper No. 378, Financial Markets Group (LSE).
[8] Burkart, M., Panunzi, F., Shleifer, A., 2003. Family firms. J. Finance 58, 2173-2207.
[9] Castillo, R. Skaperdas, St., 2003. All in the family? Law and appropriative costs as
determinants of ownership structure. Working paper No. 921, CESifo.
[10] Claessens, St., Djankov, S., Fan, J.P.H., Lang, L.H.P., 2002. Disentangling the incentive
and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. J. Finance 57, 2741-2771.
[11] Croci, E., 2004. The market for partial corporate control in Europe: the evidence about
corporate raiders. University of Lugano.
[12] Denis, D.K., McConnell, J., 2003. International corporate governance. J. Finan. Quant.
Anal. 38, 1-36.
[13] Dyck, A., Zingales, L., 2004. Private benefits of control: an international comparison. J.
Finance 59, 537-600.
[14] Dzierzanowski, M., Tamowicz, P., 2001. Ownership and control of polish listed corpora-
tions. Gdansk Institute for Market Economics.
[15] Enriques, L., 2002. The law on company directors’ self-dealing: a comparative analysis.
Int. Compar. Corp. Law J. 2 (3), 297-333.
[16] Faccio, M., Lang, L.H.P., Young, L., 2001. Dividends and expropriation. Amer. Econ. Rev.
91, 54-78.
[17] Himmelberg, Ch.P., Hubbard, G., Love, I., 2001. Investor protection, ownership, and
capital allocation. Columbia University.
[18] Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W., 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs
and capital structure. J. Finan. Econ. 3, 305-360.
[19] Kole, St.R., Lehn, K.M., 1999. Deregulation and the adaption of governance structure:
the case of the U.S. airline industry. J. Finan. Econ. 52, 79-117.
33
[20] Kraakman, R.R., Davies, P., Hansmann, H., Hertig, G., Hopt, K.J., Kanda, H., Rock,
E.B., 2003. The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach.
Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford.
[21] Kyle, A.S., Vila, J.-L., 1991. Noise trading and takeovers. RAND J. Econ. 22, 54-71.
[22] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate ownership around the
world. J. Finance 54, 471-517.
[23] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2004. What works in securities laws?
Harvard University.
[24] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. Legal determinants
of external finance. J. Finance 52, 1131-1150.
[25] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1998. Law and finance. J.
Polit. Economy 106, 1113-1155.
[26] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 2000a. Agency problems
and dividend policies around the world. J. Finance 55, 1-33.
[27] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 2000b. Investor protection
and corporate governance. J. Finan. Econ. 58, 3-27.
[28] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 2002. Investor protection
and corporate valuation. J. Finance 57, 1147-1170.
[29] Lins, K.V., 2003. Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets. J. Finan. Quant.
Anal. 38, 1-36.
[30] Murphy, K., 1998. Executive compensation. In Ashenfelter, O., Card, D., (Eds.), Hand-
book of Labor Economics. North Holland, Amsterdam.
[31] Nenova, T., 2003. The value of corporate voting rights and control: a cross-country analy-
sis. J. Finan. Econ. 68, 325-351.
[32] Olsson, M., Alasheyeva, J., 2000. Market transparency, ownership concentration and har-
monization of law in some East European countries: a critical note. Swedish Network for
European Studies in Economics and Business (SNEE), Mölle Sweden, May 15/18 2000.
[33] Pagano, M., Röell, A., 1998. The choice of stock ownership structure: agency costs, mon-
itoring and the decision to go public. Quart. J. Economics 113, 187-226.
[34] Pistor, K., 2000. Patterns of legal change: shareholder and creditor rights in transition
economies. Working paper No. 49/2000, EBRD.
[35] Pistor, K., Raiser, M., Gelfer, St., 2000. Law and finance in transition economies. Working
paper No. 48/2000, EBRD.
[36] Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. J. Finance 52, 737—783.
[37] Shleifer, A., Wolfenzon, D., 2002. Investor protection and equity markets. J. Finan. Econ.
66, 3-27.
[38] Siegel, J., 2003. Can foreign firms bond themselves effectively by renting U.S. securities
laws. Harvard Business School.
[39] Sprenger, C., 2001. Ownership and corporate governance in Russian industry: a survey.
Pampeu Fabra University (Barcelona).
34
[40] Stepanov, S., 2003. Investor protection, ownership structure, and separating control from
cash flow rights. ECARES.
35
